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Introduction
Over the past decades, the United States has become increasingly integrated in the world economy.
Trade flows have grown faster than GDP for most of this period, and according to the latest figures released by the U.S. Census bureau, the stock of foreign born residents has reached in 2010 almost 40 million, or 13% of the total population, a figure last observed in 1920. 1 Very low trade barriers and comparatively liberal migration policies have made these developments possible. How did these policies come into being? In particular, what drove U.S. congressmen to support the recent wave of globalization? 2 The goal of this paper is to answer this question by carrying out a comparative analysis of congressmen's voting behavior on trade and migration policy.
Many observers have emphasized the differences that exist between the two facets of globalization we study in this paper. For instance, looking at the experience of the New World between 1860 and 1930 , Collins, O'Rourke, and Williamson (1999 suggest that "policy did not behave as if New World politicians and voters thought trade and immigration were substitutes" (p. 252). In a recent survey, Greenaway and Nelson (2006) argue that "the domestic politics of international trade seems to differ in fundamental ways from the domestic politics of immigration... " (p. 295) and suggest that, while material interests are paramount in explaining the formation of trade policy, non-economic considerations are key to understand migration policy. The important role played by non-economic drivers has also been emphasized by the literature on the determinants of public opinion towards immigration (see for instance Mayda 2006 , Dustmann and Preston 2007 , and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007 and in the historical account of the determinants of migration policy by Timmer and Williamson (1996) . Focusing on economic drivers, we highlight instead the important similarities in the forces that shape voting decisions in the two policy areas.
To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple two-country, two-goods Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical framework in which Home -representing the United States -is skilled-labor abundant, whereas Foreign -representing the rest of the world -is unskilled-labor abundant. Furthermore, we assume that Home is subdivided in electoral districts that differ in their endowments of skilled and unskilled labor. Each district is represented by an elected politician, who supports a new policy if it increases the well being of voters' in his constituency. We consider two alternative policy scenarios: a trade liberalization and the liberalization of the inflow of unskilled migrants.
As long as factor endowment differences between Home and Foreign are not too large, we show that a legislator is more likely to support trade or migration liberalization the more skilled-labor 1 The very large recent inflows of foreign nationals have also contributed to substantially change the ethnic mix in the country. In May 2012, the U.S. Census Bureau announced that more than half of the newborn in 2011 belonged to ethnic minorities.
2 For a historical perspective, see Faini, de Melo, and Zimmermann (1999) and Hatton and Williamson (2007) .
abundant his district is.
We assess the empirical predictions of our model using a novel dataset that combines final passage votes on trade liberalization and immigration reforms introduced over the 1970-2006 period.
We focus on the behavior of U.S. Representatives, matching their votes to a wealth of individualand district-level characteristics that capture both economic and non-economic drivers. Our analysis suggests that, despite significant differences in congressmen's voting patterns on trade and migration policy, important similarities in their determinants should not be overlooked. In particular, economic drivers that work through the labor market do play an important role in shaping legislators' voting behavior on both types of policies. Consistently with our model's predictions, we find that representatives from more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade liberalization and a more open stance vis-à-vis unskilled immigration. In terms of magnitudes, the effects are sizeable. Our preferred specification suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of skilled individuals in a congressional district leads approximately to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability that the district's representative supports trade liberalization, and to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability that he supports the liberalization of unskilled immigration. At the same time, we also find that there are significant differences between the drivers of voting on trade and migration policy. First, our results suggest that welfare state considerations play an important role in shaping support for immigration: in particular, representatives of richer and more unequal constituencies are less likely to support open immigration policies, whereas this is not true when it comes to trade liberalization. Second, ideological differences play an important role: Democratic legislators are systematically more likely to support the liberalization of migration policies than their Republican counterparts, whereas the opposite is true when it comes to trade policy. Third, non-economic factors linked to immigrant networks affect legislators' decisions on migration, but have no impact on trade policy choices.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to systematically investigate and compare the drivers of legislators' decisions on immigration and trade policy in the United
States. The post 1970 era on which we focus is particularly interesting, as the 1965 Immigrant and Nationality Act and the 1974 Trade Act introduced reforms that changed in fundamental ways policy making in the two areas.
A large literature has studied trade policy choices in the U.S. Congress. Destler (2005) offers a detailed historical and political account of U.S. trade policy-making in the post 1934 area. Several recent papers have focused instead on the role of economic determinants of trade policy decisions. Hiscox (2002) has considered the impact of factor endowments and industry interests in shaping thirty important trade bills introduced between 1824 and 1994. Baldwin and Magee (2000) have emphasized the role of lobbying efforts in shaping congressional votes, examining three important trade policy measures introduced in the nineties. Blonigen and Figlio (1998) have examined the role of foreign direct investment on U.S. senators' voting behavior on trade policy between [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . More recently, Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2012) have analyzed the role of strategic delegation motives in shaping the congressmen's support for fast track authority, whereas Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2011) have considered the impact of term length and election proximity on votes on trade liberalization.
There is also a growing literature on the political economy of migration policy in the U.S.
The study by Goldin (1994) of the introduction of the literacy test represents one of the first contributions in the economics literature. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) is probably the most comprehensive study to date of the Congressional Politics of immigration policy, but only limited attention is dedicated to the analysis of district-level economic determinants. Several papers focus on the introduction of a single piece of legislation or a narrow set of legislative initiatives.
For instance, Gonzalez and Kamdar (2000) analyze the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and find that representatives of districts characterized by a higher share of workers employed in low-skill intensive industries tend to favor immigration restrictions.
Similar results have been obtained by Fetzer (2006) in his analysis of voting on the 2005 Border protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act. In a comprehensive study of the immigration legislation introduced in the post 1970 period, Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) also obtain robust evidence that district-level economic determinants do play an important role in shaping immigration policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the recent developments in the congressional history of trade and migration policy. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model to guide our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes our data, whereas Section 5 presents our main results. In Section 6 we carry out a series of robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
U.S. Trade and migration policy 1970-2006: An overview
The votes included in our sample cover the years 1970-2006, a period during which the United States has engaged in a series of important measures to further liberalize trade, and immigration flows have soared to levels seen only at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the main policy initiatives that have been introduced in this period in the two areas. For a summary of the bills considered in our study, see Tables 1 and 2 .
1970-1980
The early seventies saw the U.S. economy in a deep recession following the first oil crisis. In dealing with the consequences of this shock, Congress reacted differently when it turned to trade and migration policies. Concerning the former, a liberal agenda was pursued, whereas for the latter, lawmakers tried to put limits to the substantial increase in immigrant flows that had followed the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. The second trade liberalization bill introduced in the 1970's was the ratification of the Tokyo Round of the GATT. Its implementation resulted in major multilateral tariff reductions for industrial products (averaging 35%), some important reduction in tariffs for tropical agricultural products, a series of measures involving non technical barriers to trade, and the implementation of the so called "Anti-Dumping code".
As for migration policy, Congress reacted to the first major oil crisis with the the introduction of two amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965. INA abolished the national-origin quota system, which was replaced by a system emphasizing the importance of family ties, resulting in a great simplification of the family reunification process. In the aftermath of the first oil crisis, the House took a more restrictionist stance on migration policy, approving in 1973 H.R. 392 and H.R. 891. While the first bill contains provisions to tackle the growing number of illegal immigrants, the second measure extended the applicability of the 20,000 percountry cap to migrants from the Western hemisphere contained in the 1965 act. This initiative was particularly aimed at limiting immigration from Mexico (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) .
1980-1990
The eighties started with the U.S. experiencing the deepest downturn since the Great Depression.
When the 99th Congress convened in 1985, it became immediately clear that trade was very high on the political agenda, and that lawmakers were broadly inclined to increase the competitiveness of the U.S. economy in the international market place. This drive resulted in the introduction of the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1986 (H.R. 4800) which included some clearly protectionist measures, like the famous Gephardt (D, MO) amendment prescribing the introduction of quotas on imports from countries that maintained both a large bilateral trade surplus with the United States and unfair import barriers (Schwab 1994) . The legislation easily passed in the House and was labeled as "pure protectionism" and an "action that would be trade destroying, not trade creating" (Destler 2005 , 1989. 4 Turning to international migration, following the introduction of restrictive measures on immigration from the Western hemisphere and the growing arrivals of refugees, much of the policy debate during the eighties focused on illegal immigrants and asylum seekers (Tichenor 1994 intertwined, since the latter is a revised version of the former. The first important provision of H.R. 1510 was to make it illegal to knowingly hire or recruit undocumented immigrants, and sanctions were introduced for those employing illegal aliens. A second major component was the requirement for employers to attest their employees' immigration status. Last but not least, the proposed legislation granted an amnesty to certain agricultural seasonal workers and immigrants.
The bill proposal was highly controversial and the House leadership did not favor the idea of it reaching the floor for final voting in an election year. For these reasons, Mazzoli decided to pull it from the floor and to reintroduce it in 1984 (Lowell, Bean, and Garza 1986 and Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . Most of the debate during this session focused on the employer sanctions and the amnesty provisions and the bill ended up clearing the House with a 216 to 211 vote, one of the narrowest in the whole immigration debate. The measure passed the Senate in a different version, and no compromise was reached in the House-Senate conference committee. The push for a comprehensive immigration reform was strong enough for a new version of the bill to be introduced in the 99th Congress in both chambers. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (H.R. 3810, IRCA) introduced a temporary program for agricultural workers, which was requested by the agricultural lobby and strongly opposed by organized labor (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . Furthermore, it implemented a controversial guest-worker initiative in the tradition of the Bracero program, 5 which enabled a legal temporary inflow of unskilled farm workers. The bill allowed almost 3.5 million illegal immigrants to be legalized as permanent residents (LeMay 2006) . The other bill included in our analysis (H.R. 4222) was aimed at a more generous handling of illegal immigrants and extended the legalization provisions of the IRCA act by six months.
1990-2000
The "roaring" nineties saw the U.S. economy experiencing one of its longest continuous expansions.
During this period, Congress embraced globalization by liberalizing both trade and migration policies. Round of the GATT lasted instead until mid December, and led to a major trade liberalization, involving substantial tariff cuts (averaging almost 40%), the requirement that agricultural quotas be converted in tariffs, and the phasing-out of restrictions to textile trade over a ten-year period.
The actual implementation of the agreement turned out to be more controversial than initially expected and voting on the bill took place only during the lame duck session in late 1994. Still, H.R. 5110 gained broad bi-partisan support and cleared the floor with a comfortable 288-146 margin.
One of the reasons for the delay in the implementation of the Uruguay Round bill was the proposal to include a seven-year extension of Fast Track Authority, deemed necessary to implement the administration's trade agenda. The measure immediately appeared to be controversial, and had to be eliminated from the text of H.R. 5110. Three years later, the Clinton administration started once again to push for renewal of Fast Track Authority, but conflicting views between the Republicans, which were mainly in favor of granting the authority with a focus restricted to trade issues, and the Democrats, which were either against the measure or favored a broader scope to include the "trade and..." agenda, led the proposal to be withdrawn by the administration in November 1997. Just before the 1998 midterm elections, the house speaker Newt Gingrich put it on the floor as H.R. 2621 to embarrass the administration, and the proposal was clearly defeated (Destler 2005) .
The nineties saw also two major initiatives concerning migration. The first was the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT). In contrast to IRCA, this bill focused mainly on legal immigration and had two main goals: the revision of the existing visa allocation system and the introduction of new provisions for skilled immigration. In particular, the IMMACT established a new preference scheme with three categories: family-based immigration (approximately 74 percent of the total), employment and business related immigration (20 percent of the total) and a new diversity category (6 percent of the total). Under the second category, people are admitted on the basis of skills and occupations, while the third category allocates green cards through a lottery program. The goal of the last category is to increase the number of immigrants from countries that previously had a low number of admissions. In practice, the role of family reunification and labor market shortages driven immigration was not altered substantially (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . The major change introduced by the legislation was the increase of the annual cap for legal permanent residents from approximately 500,000 to 700,000. Finally, the act established also a short-term amnesty program to grant legal residence to up to 165,000 spouses and minor children of immigrants, who were legalized under the IRCA. 
2000-2006
The new century started with the burst of the dot-com bubble, and with the terrorist attacks of While the former was uncontroversial, the approval of the agreement with Oman was subject to a much closer scrutiny in the aftermath of a National Labor Committee report, suggesting that labor rights violations were widespread in Jordan's export zones (Bolle 2006 
A simple theoretical framework
Consider a model with two countries c = H, F that use two factors, (human) capital and labor, to produce two goods, X and Y . Both sectors employ constant returns to scale production functions, and the two countries share identical technologies. Good X is labor-intensive, whereas good Y is capital-intensive. Country H and country F are endowed with the same amount of (human) capital K H = K L = K, whereas the foreign country has more labor L at its disposal, so that L F > L H .
Consumers i share identical homothetic preferences both within and across countries, and as a result their indirect utility takes the simple form V (p, I i ) = V (p)I i where p is the prevailing price vector and I i is individual i's income.
The Home country is partitioned in districts d, where d = 1, ..., D, each inhabited by the same number N of domestic citizens. Each citizen of the Home country supplies 1/N units of labor and K i units of capital. As a result, K d = ∑ i∈d K i is the total capital available in the district, whereas the labor supply of each district is given by L d = 1 ∀d. For simplicity, we assume instead that individuals in country F are either endowed with labor, or with capital. 6
Consider two possible scenarios. In the first, country H and F move from autarky to free trade. In the second, the two countries completely liberalize labor flows between each other, and individuals relocating abroad consume their income in the destination country. For simplicity, trade and migration are assumed to be costless.
As long as the initial factor endowment differences are not too big, standard theory (see Mundell 1957 , Dixit and Norman 1980 and Wellisch and Walz 1998 suggests that both liberalizing trade and liberalizing labor flows will allow to replicate the integrated equilibrium, i.e. the outcome that would emerge if the two countries were to merge completely. Moving from autarky to the integrated equilibrium has important implications for the Home country. In fact, given that we are in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin setting, compared to autarky the integrated equilibrium involves a decline in the relative price of good X in Home, a decline in the real return to labor, and an increase in the real return to capital. In the free trade equilibrium, the Home country exports the capital intensive good Y and imports the labor intensive good X. At the same time, in the free migration equilibrium, it receives an inflow of workers from the foreign country, which leads to a decline in the domestic wages and an increase in the return to capital.
Assume now that each district is represented by a legislator. In choosing whether to support a policy that liberalizes migration or trade, district d's representative maximizes the well-being of the citizens of his constituency, which is represented by
This leads immediately to the main prediction of our theoretical model:
Proposition 1 In the capital-abundant country, the likelihood that a representative will support a more open trade or migration policy increases in the capital-to-labor ratio of his district.
Proof. The income of district d's average resident is given by
In the capitalabundant country, trade liberalization leads to a decline in the wage w and an increase in the return to capital r. As a result, the larger is K d , the greater is the improvement in the representative citizen's income and welfare. An inflow of foreign workers will have the same effect on factor returns and thus on income and welfare.
Across jurisdictions, the representative of a district with a higher capital-to-labor ratio is more likely to support a bill liberalizing trade or migration. Our simple model thus suggests that a legislator's voting behavior on trade and migration liberalization should be crucially affected by Figure 1 . On the horizontal axis we depict the average capitallabor ratio of district d, whereas on the vertical axis we measure the change in the indirect utility of the average individual in the district resulting from the liberalization of trade or migration. As it can be seen from the picture, more labor-abundant districts will lose from the policy change, whereas more capital-abundant districts will gain and the more so the larger is their ratio K d N .
Data description
Our dataset draws on a number of different sources. We collect information on all legislative votes on trade and migration issues in the U.S. House of Representatives using the Congressional Roll Call Voting Dataset of the Policy Agenda Project and the Library of Congress (THOMAS). Since these datasets provide only rough information about the content of the bills, we have supplemented them using additional sources, like the Congressional Quarterly publications and existing historical accounts like the ones by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) and Destler (2005) .
As for legislation related to trade, we focus on all major trade bills 7 introduced in the U.S. Table 1 and the discussion in Section 2). With respect to immigration, we restrict our analysis to bills with a potential impact on the supply of unskilled labor (i.e. that either regulate legal immigration or tackle illegal immigration). In particular, we follow the same methodology as in Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) and focus on bills that can have a direct (positive or negative) impact on the size of the unskilled labor force in the U.S. We thus exclude, for instance, bills that deal primarily with the provision of public goods to illegal migrants or the federal reimbursement of health and education costs to states.
Congress between 1970 and 2006 (see
We restrict our attention to final passage votes, which determine whether a bill clears the House or not. In doing so, we exclude votes on amendments. We follow this approach because voting on amendments is often connected to strategic voting and therefore is less likely to distinctly reflect the interests of the a legislator's constituency. Tables 1 and 2 Finally, we match our data on individual voting records with information on the economic and non-economic characteristics of electoral constituencies. For this purpose, we use data from the Congressional District Data Files of Adler (2003) and Lublin (1997) , who have aggregated Census data at the congressional-district level, taking into account the decennial redistricting. We supplement them using information taken directly from the U.S. Census whenever needed.
Our dependent variables are the representative's votes on bills regulating trade (V oteT rade it ), and immigration (V oteImmigration it ). In the case of bills liberalizing trade or migration, a vote coded 1 indicates that the district's representative votes in favor of more open trade or immigration, and 0 otherwise. In the case of legislation restricting trade or immigration, a vote is coded 0 if the representative votes in favor of a restrictive policy and 1 otherwise.
Two set of drivers are used to explain voting behavior. The first is a set of standard individuallevel controls. We start with a measure of ideology, which is proxied by Democrat, a dummy variable taking a value of one if the representative is a member of the Democratic party. We have also used two alternative measures: the first dimension of the DW nominate score, which increases in an individual's conservative orientation; and the ADA score, which assesses every legislator on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher figures assigned to more liberal politicians. 8 Age and gender have been shown to play a significant role in shaping individual attitudes towards trade and migration (see for instance Mayda and Rodrik 2005 and Mayda 2009 In addition to controlling for the ideological orientation of the individual congressmen, we also account for the share of Democratic votes in the past election to capture the ideological stance of the congressional district. Our last set of controls includes proxies for the the degree of urbanization of the district and its ethnic composition. To this end we use Census data, and construct the variable U rban it that captures the share of the population living in urban areas, to account for potential differences in attitudes towards immigration and trade between rural and urban areas. Next, we define the variable F oreign − born it , which measures the the share of foreign-born in the district's population, to account for possible network effects influencing both support for trade and immigration liberalization. Finally, we explore the existence of possible coalitions among minorities in shaping migration policy by including Af rican − American it , i.e.
the share of blacks in the population.
We have collected data for the 17 trade bills listed in Table 1 and for the 12 migration bills listed in Table 2 . To insure that our findings are not driven by differences in the timing of the voting and in the sample size across the two types of initiatives, we carry out most of our analysis on a sub-sample of matched bills, which are described in Table 3 . In particular, we restrict our attention to those trade and immigration votes that took place in the same year. As it turns out, in a few instances more than one immigration or trade policy initiative was voted upon in a given year. In these cases, we use the date of the vote as the selection criterion, matching bills that are chronologically closer to each other. This leaves us with six sets of votes. We focus on the behavior of those individuals who have cast a vote on both the trade and immigration policy initiative, to ensure that we compare the voting behavior of the same group of individuals on the two measures. 9 Table 4 provides summary statistics for the matched sample used in our analysis. The first stylized fact that emerges is the broad differences in support for trade and migration, which closely reflect the differences in congressional action on trade and migration policy discussed in Section 2: while in only 39% of our observations a representative voted in favor of freer immigration, the corresponding figure for trade was 61%. Turning to our main explanatory variable, namely the district's skill composition, on average almost one out of five Americans over 25 in our sample holds at least a bachelor's degree. 10 The skill ratio of the population shows, like the voting behavior on immigration and trade policy, a strong variation across congressional districts, and the main goal of our paper is to investigate whether there exists a systematic relationship between a representative's voting behavior on these two policy dimensions and the relative skill composition of his/her home district. , 2b and 2c illustrate the main economic mechanism highlighted in our theoretical model, focusing as an example, on the most recent trade and migration votes in our matched 9 Of course, not participating in a vote or abstaining from it could be the result of a conscious choice by the representative and in this case our estimates would suffer from sample selection bias. As it turns out, in less than 8% of the votes we consider, we observe a congressperson casting his/her ballot only on the trade or the migration reform. As a result, selection does not appear to be a major source of concern.
Figures 2a
10 This figure is in part due to the fact that out of the six bills included in our matched sample, four have been introduced during the 109th congress i.e. between 2005 and 2006. sample. The top portion of each presents the characteristics in 2006 of congressional districts in Georgia, a state with a skill composition that closely resembles the US average (the fraction of working age individuals with a college degree or above is in both cases approximately 24%). In the bottom part we instead magnify the district around the state's largest city and capital, Atlanta.
In Figure 2a , we use Census data to illustrate the share of highly skilled in the population in 2006. The dark-shaded areas are skilled-labor abundant districts. 11 In Figure 2b Figure 2b ) -supported immigration restrictions. Both were members of the Republican party (see Table 5 ). On the other hand, Congressmen Lewis, who represented skilled-labor abundant district 5, voted against trade liberalizing H.R. 6406 (see the bottom of Figure 2b ). He belonged to the Democratic party (see Table 5 ). This evidence highlights the key role played by the district's skill composition in explaining voting behavior, as well as the profound divide along party lines on immigration and trade policy. In the remainder of the paper, we will systematically exploit the role of these and other economic and non-economic characteristics in explaining the voting behavior of elected members of Congress.
Empirical analysis
Our simple theoretical model shows that a representative's voting behavior on trade and immigration is a function of the skill composition of his constituency. The main prediction is that a district's skill composition affects a representative's voting behavior on trade and migration liberalization bills in the same direction. In particular, legislators from more skilled-labor abundant districts should be more likely to support liberalizing unskilled migration as well as trade. In this section, we will assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis in two ways. First, we will consider the entire set of votes on trade and immigration bills included in our sample. This will allow us to identify the broad patterns in the data. Next, we will focus our analysis on a set of matched votes, in which a trade and a migration measure came to the House floor during the same Congress. This will allow us to study the behavior of the same individual in the two policy areas we are considering in this paper.
Full sample
We start by providing results based on the full sample of all trade and immigration bills, for which roll call votes are available. We will assess our theoretical prediction by estimating two separate probit models for trade and migration:
according to the following scheme:
where V oteT it and V oteM it are dichotomous variables taking a value of one if the representative of district i votes in favor of a bill liberalizing trade, respectively unskilled migration, at time t.
SkillRatio it is the share of the population over 25 years of age with at least a bachelor's degree, X it is a vector of additional explanatory variables specific to a district i and/or its congressperson and β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. I t and I s are respectively time and state dummies to account for unobserved time-and state-specific effects, 12 and ϵ 1 and ϵ 2 are error terms. The corresponding results are provided in Tables 6 and 7 . In order to simplify the interpretation of our findings, we report marginal effects. Thus, our estimates capture the change in the probability of voting in favor of a more open trade (immigration) policy, due to an infinitesimal change in each continuous explanatory variable, and a discrete change for dichotomous explanatory variables.
First, in Table 6 we report our findings on the determinants of the voting behavior on trade policy. Column 1 presents the results of a parsimonious specification focusing on individual characteristics of the representative. Some important results emerge. In particular, we find that
Republican representatives are more likely to support trade liberalization than their Democratic counterparts. This result is in line with previous studies highlighting that Democrats are systematically more protectionist than Republicans during the period we consider in our analysis (e.g. Blonigen and Figlio 1998 , Baldwin and Magee 2000 , Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi 2012 .
Our results also suggest that the likelihood to support trade liberalization decreases with age (see also Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi 2012) , while gender does not seem to play a robust role. In column 2, we focus on the role of the channel highlighted in our theoretical model, by examining the impact of the district's skill composition. We find strong support for the predictions of our model: legislators from more skill-abundant districts are more likely to vote in favor of trade liberalization, and the effect is significant at the 1% level. In columns 3 we additionally explore the role played by welfare state considerations, controlling for mean family income and inequality at the district level. Our results suggest that this channel does not affect the voting behavior on trade policy. The same holds true when we include non-economic drivers that capture the district's ethnic composition and its degree of urbanization (column 4). Importantly, the inclusion of additional controls in columns (3) and (4) does not affect the sign and significance of our main explanatory variable. As for the magnitude of the effect, the results of our benchmark specification (column 4) suggest that a one percentage point increase in the skill ratio in a congressional district leads approximately to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability that the district's representative supports trade liberalization. Table 7 presents the estimates of our empirical model for immigration policy, and follows the same structure as Table 6 . First, concerning the individual characteristics of the legislators, we find that Democratic representatives are more likely to support immigration liberalization than their Republican counterparts. This result stands in sharp contrast with what we have found for trade policy bills and is robust to the inclusion of district controls (see columns 2-4). Furthermore, our estimates suggest that female members of Congress are more likely to support immigration liberalization. However, once we start controlling for district characteristics, gender differences in voting behavior become less significant. Importantly, as predicted by our theoretical model, legislators from more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support immigration policies aiming to liberalize the inflow of unskilled immigrants (column 2). This relationship has already been highlighted by Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) . In column 3, we examine also the role of the welfare state channel, which the literature suggests should play an important role in determining legislators' voting behavior on immigration (Boeri, McCormick, and Hanson 2002 and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007) . In particular, we expect legislators from wealthier constituencies to exhibit less favorable attitudes towards unskilled immigration, as unskilled immigrants are likely to be net receivers of public benefits and services. Economic theory also suggests that inequality within a constituency should increase the redistribution carried out by a government (Meltzer and Richard 1981) . Thus, representatives of districts characterized by higher inequality should support unskilled immigration less, as the burden of poor, unskilled immigrants is likely to be larger. Our findings support these predictions: representatives elected in wealthier districts are less likely to favor policies liberalizing unskilled immigration; the same is true for congresspersons from districts characterized by higher inequality, as soon as we account for geographic and network factors (see column 4 in Table 7 ).
While we do not find any significant differences between legislators representing urban and rural districts, our results show that a higher share of foreign-born and African-Americans within a district leads to a higher likelihood to support liberalization of unskilled immigration. This relationship is likely to be driven by social and family networks as well as by the identification with ethnic minorities. 13 Importantly, including additional controls in columns (3) and (4) does not affect the sign and significance of our main explanatory variable. As for the magnitude of the effect, our benchmark specification (column 4) suggests that a one percentage point increase in the skill ratio in a congressional district leads approximately to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability that the district's representative supports the liberalization of unskilled immigration.
To summarize, the estimates from the full sample provide strong support for the predictions of our model. In particular, we find robust evidence that the district's skill composition affects legislative voting behavior on trade and migration liberalization bills in the same direction. In addition, two important differences emerge: first, Democratic party members are more likely to support liberal immigration legislation than their Republican counterparts, whereas they are less likely to vote for free trade. Second, our results highlight that welfare state considerations and a district's ethnic composition affect decisions on immigration policy, but have no impact on trade policy decisions.
Matched sample
Up to this point, our results have been based on the entire sample, covering all trade and immigration roll call votes that took place in the post-1970 period. However, Table 1 and 2 show that the number and the timing of the introduction of immigration and trade policy initiatives are very different. As a result, the findings discussed in Section 5.1 could be driven by sample differences, i.e. differences in the number of policy initiatives involving trade and immigration and differences in the timing of the various reforms. The latter in particular could imply that different individuals are called upon voting on trade and immigration initiatives. To address this concern, we restrict our attention on the sample of matched bills described in Table 3 (see Section 4 for more details 13 For a detailed discussion see Facchini and Steinhardt (2011). on its construction).
Furthermore, one might be concerned that the decisions on trade and immigration of each legislator might be interrelated, i.e. they might both be affected by common unobserved characteristics of the congressman or his district. If this is the case, the error terms of the two probit models in (1) and (2) are likely to be correlated. Following Greene (2011) , we will assume that the two error terms consist of one component (u j , j = 1, 2) that is unique to each model and a second component (η) that is common to both models. More specifically,
After the estimation of a bivariate probit, it is possible to test whether the covariance of between the error terms ϵ 1 and ϵ 2 is equal to zero, a result that would imply that two probit models can be estimated independently. In our case, using our preferred specification the formal test shows that we have to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the two error terms. 14 As a result, our analysis of the matched sample will be carried out using a bivariate probit model.
The results of the bivariate probit regressions based on the matched sample are presented in Table 8 , where we report coefficient estimates for the effect of the various controls. Notice that the sign of the effect of the various determinants of the voting behavior on both trade (column 1) and immigration (column 2) are very similar to those obtained in our estimates based on the full sample. We therefore can rule out that our findings in Section 5.1 have been driven by differences in the two samples. Thus, legislators from more highly skilled districts are more likely to support liberalization of both trade and migration, in line with the predictions of our model. Interestingly, the estimated magnitude of the impact of our skill measure obtained from the matched sample using the bivariate probit methodology is very close to the one obtained running separate probit models using the entire sample of votes. 15 In fact, the conditional marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the share of skilled individuals on support for trade liberalization is comprised between 0.88 and 0.98 percentage points, 16 whereas the conditional marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the share of skilled individuals on support for migration liberalization is comprised between 1.61 and 1.76 percentage points. 17 Our estimates also 14 The corresponding Wald test for ρ = 0 is χ 2 (1) = 3.08408 and P rob > χ 2 = 0.0791. 15 Marginal effects for each outcome of a bivariate probit model should be calculated conditional on the other outcome (i.e., conditional marginal effects) because the two equations are not independent. For this reason, we report two conditional marginal effects for our variable of interest in each of the two set of votes. 16 In particular, the marginal effect conditioning on not supporting migration liberalization is 0.88, whereas the marginal effect conditioning on supporting migration liberalization is 0.98. The unconditional effect is 0.55. 17 In particular, the marginal effect conditioning on not supporting trade liberalization is 1.76, whereas the confirm the important differences concerning the welfare-state and non-economic determinants. In particular, it is worth highlighting the significant impact of fiscal exposure and ethnic networks for immigration reforms, which is instead absent for votes on trade reforms.
Additional results
In this section, we assess the robustness of our empirical findings by implementing a number of additional specifications. We start by introducing an alternative measure of districts' skill composition and by investigating the role played by additional economic drivers. We next turn to political drivers, exploring in greater details the influence of ideological factors at the individual and constituency level, and the role of lobbying in shaping trade and migration policies. Third,
we explore to what extent our findings are sensitive to changes in the sample structure. Last, we account for unobservable characteristics at the individual level, by considering a specification that includes individual legislator fixed effects. All our robustness checks focus on the sample of matched votes, with the exception of the last one, where we use the full sample of bills to maximize the number of observations for each individual.
Economic drivers
In column 1 of Table 9 , we start by replacing the share of highly skilled individuals in a district defined as based on educational achievement with a definition that is based on occupation. In particular, SkillRatioOccupation it describes the percentage of individuals over 16 employed in executive, administrative, managerial and professional specialty occupations. Once again, our results strongly support the predictions of the theoretical model: a representative of a district characterized by a larger share of high skilled individuals is more likely to support the liberalization of both trade and immigration. The effects of the other district and individual characteristics are comparable to what we have found in our benchmark specification (see Table 8 ).
In columns 2 and 3, we add information about sectoral employment at the district level and about the extent of redistribution carried out at the state level. In particular, in column 2, we include the share of farm workers within a district, as this is a sector that often received special treatment in trade policy making and also employs large numbers of immigrant workers (see Hanson and Spilimbergo 2001) . Our results indicate that the extent of employment in agriculture does not affect the voting decision of representatives on trade and immigration reforms. In column 3, we account also for the possible impact of the amount of redistribution carried out at the state marginal effect conditioning on supporting migration liberalization is 1.61. The unconditional effect is 0.93.
level (W elf are it ), which does not appear to affect the voting behavior of elected officials on trade and immigration policy. 18 In all specifications, the sign and significance of our key explanatory variable, namely the skill measure at the district level, are unaffected. 19
Political drivers
We turn next to consider in Table 10 several robustness checks concerning political determinants.
In column 1, we start by replacing the legislator's party affiliation, with his/her DW nominate score, where a higher figure indicates that the politician is more conservative (see Section 4 for the definition). Our results suggest that more conservative politicians are more likely to support trade liberalization, whereas they are more likely to vote against pro-immigration measures. Once again, the sign and significance of our main explanatory variable are not affected. In column 2 the representative's ideological leaning is instead measured using the ADA score, where a higher figure indicates that the politician is more liberal (see Section 4 for the definition). The findings in column 2 are broadly comparable to those reported in column 1. To account for the ideological orientation of the voting population within a district, in column 3 we also control for the extent of party strength in the previous congressional election. Although the signs of the coefficients are as expected, we do not find any evidence that the constituency's ideology has a separate impact on the voting behavior on immigration and trade legislation. Once again, our main results are not affected.
So far, our analysis has focused on the role played by the characteristics of the districts' average voter. In column 4 of Table 10 , we include information on organized groups, which have received great attention both in the trade literature 20 and in the literature on migration. 21 Our measure of the intensity of the lobbying activity is given by Political Action Committee Contributions (PACs) which are available since 1979 and can be easily traced to elected officials. In particular, we focus on the role played by contributions offered by corporations (PacCorporate) and by unions (PacLabor ). As PACs measure lobbying effort on a variety of different issues, we have considered a politician to have been "influenced" if the corporate (labor) contributions he/she has received are at or above the eightieth percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year. 22
18 This result is hardly surprising since we are including state and year fixed effects in the specification. 19 We have also run a series of specifications that included additional district level controls, like unemployment and different measures of the size of the redistribution carried at the state level. Our main results were unaffected and these models are available upon request from the authors.
20 See for instance the theoretical analysis by Grossman and Helpman 1994 and the empirical implementations by Goldberg and Maggi 1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000. 21 See Facchini and Willmann (2005) , Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) and Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011) . 22 We have experimented with different thresholds, and the qualitative results are unaffected. With respect to the missing observations for 1973, to retain enough observations in our matched sample we have assumed that
In line with the existing literature, we find that lobbying activities do affect the voting behavior of elected representatives on trade policy. In particular, larger contributions by labor organizations tend to result in a more protectionist bias by the politician, whereas larger contributions by business related lobbies have the opposite effect. This result confirms earlier findings by Baldwin and Magee (2000) . At the same time, we find that neither corporate nor labor PAC contributions affect the voting behavior of elected officials on immigration policy. This is in line with the findings of Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011) , who show that PAC contributions are not a significant driver of immigration policy, whereas the opposite is true for lobbying expenditure directly related to migration policy. 23
Sample
So far we have implicitly assumed that all proposed bills carry the same impact on the economic interests of the constituency. This is of course a simplification, and we are concerned that our results might be driven by bills of minor importance. To account for this, we have carried out our analysis on a restricted sample, focusing only on matches that involve at least one major trade and/or immigration reform (H.R. 10710/H. R. 891, H.R. 4800/H.R. 3810 and H.R. 4340/H.R. 4437 ). The results are reported in column 1 of Table 11 and show that our initial findings are remarkably robust. Interestingly, when focusing only on the most important bills, the effects of the district's skill composition are almost identical in size for trade and immigration reforms.
In constructing our matched sample, we followed chronological proximity as the matching criterion. In 1988 two important pieces of trade legislation came to the floor within less than a month: H.R. 4848, i.e. the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and H.R. 5090, the approval of the Canada U.S. Free Trade Area. In the same year, H.R. 4222, a bill extending the legalization program introduced by IRCA came to the floor. In our benchmark analysis H.R. 4848 was matched with H.R. 4222, and in column 2 of Table 11 we show that matching instead H.R. 5090 with H.R.
yields very similar results.
representatives who received contributions at or above the eightieth percentile in 1979 also belonged to the "top" receivers in 1973. 23 Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011) use a dataset that allows to identify the purpose of the lobbying activity in the United States, showing that pressure groups at the sectoral level have a statistically significant and important effect on the allocation of work and related visas. Unfortunately, this data cannot be used in our analysis of congressmen's voting behavior, since it does not contain information on the identity of politicians contacted by lobbies.
Legislator fixed effects
Following the existing literature, we have so far controlled for a variety of individual-level characteristics of the legislator, including age, gender and political orientation (measured by party affiliation as well as by ADA and DW-Nominate scores). However, we are concerned that a number of other individual characteristics that we cannot observe could also influence the representative's voting behavior. In particular, some of these unobservable features might be correlated with the skill composition of a district, and lead to parameter estimates that suffer from an omitted variable bias. For example, a liberal representative may be more likely to be elected in a skilled labor abundant district. To account for unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics, we include individual fixed effects in the specification reported in Table 12 , where our analysis is carried out using the full sample of bills to maximize the number of observations per individual. 24 The inclusion of legislator fixed effects implies that we are not able to control for observable (essentially) time-invariant characteristics at the individual level like gender or party affiliation. We can, however control for the time-varying ideological stance of the lawmaker by using his DW nominate score. In the specification with individual fixed effects and time dummies we are also not able to explicitly account for representatives' age, which is perfectly collinear with the time dummies. Our estimation strategy instead exploits the variation in the skill composition at the district level to identify the latter's effect on the congressperson's voting behavior on trade and migration policies.
We find that an increase in the share of highly skilled residents in a district positively affects the probability that each representative supports both measures liberalizing trade and immigration. 25
This finding strongly suggests the existence of a causal link between a districts' skill composition and a representative's voting behavior.
Conclusions
This paper represents the first attempt to systematically investigate and compare the drivers of legislators' choices on trade and migration policy.
To guide our analysis, we have developed a simple theoretical model that emphasizes the importance of the skill composition of a constituency. Our framework predicts that representatives of constituencies in which skilled labor is more abundant should be more likely to favor a policy liberalizing trade or increasing unskilled immigration. We have empirically assessed this predictions using a new dataset, which includes all U.S. House of Representatives final passage votes on trade and immigration policy over the period 1970-2006. While some earlier literature emphasizes the differences between policy making in these two areas, our analysis suggests that important similarities should not be overlooked. In particular, we find that labor market factors, as captured by the complementarity and substitutability between the domestic factor supplies and changes in those factor supplies brought about (directly or indirectly) through trade and migration, are key drivers of legislators' voting behavior. In particular, representatives of more skilled-labor abundant constituencies are more likely to vote for liberalizing trade and immigration. Our results also confirm important differences in the drivers of trade and migration policy, which can help to explain why politicians are often more reluctant to lower barriers to low-skilled migrants than to goods, notwithstanding the large potential gains from further migration liberalization. 26 In particular, our analysis suggests that welfare state considerations play an important role in shaping the support for immigration, whereas this is not true when it comes to trade liberalization. We also highlight significant ideological differences:
Democratic legislators are systematically more likely to support the liberalization of migration policies than their Republican counterparts, while the opposite is true when it comes to trade policy. Finally, non-economic factors that work through immigrant networks have an impact on legislators' support for migration, but not for trade. 
